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Background:	This article addresses two problems. The first is 
the Flexibility Problem: If we are to use a more flexible format 
for theories of change than for traditional logic models, one 
in which we can no longer assume that we only value things 
which are at the end of causal chains, nor that we intervene 
on all the things at the beginning of causal chains, how then 
can we show which things we value, and which things we 
intervene on? The second is the Definition Problem: What is 
the difference between a theory showing the causal 
influences within and around a project and, more specifically, 
a theory of change for the project? 
 







Research Design:  N/A 
 
Data Collection and Analysis: N/A 
 
Findings: A definition of “Theory of Change” is introduced, 
based upon a definition of “Theory” together with two 
symbols to mark variables we value (“♥"#”, or any suitable 
alternative symbol) and variables we intervene on (“▶%&'”, or 
any suitable alternative symbol). These two definitions and 
the two symbols together answer both the Flexibility Problem 
and the Definition Problem, and have some interesting side-
effects as follows. Firstly, they suggest that it is the task of 
evaluators to model how stakeholders value aspects of a 
project just as much as it is to model the causal chains within 
a project. Secondly, evaluators are able to model the fact that 
stakeholders may value variables which are not at the end of 
a causal chain, throwing a new light on the debate between 
results-based and principles-based programming. Thirdly, 
they provide a way to understand the behaviour of 
stakeholders and stakeholder groups in terms of their own 
theories of change – the way they view the world and how 
they can get what they want – rather than from the traditional 
behaviourist perspective more familiar to most evaluators. 
Keywords: Theories of Change; valuing; theory. 
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The Flexibility Problem: Going Beyond 
Logic Models 
 
In most traditional logic models and logical 
frameworks, the items are ordered into a neat 
system of layers (“inputs”, “outputs” etc) in a strict 
hierarchical format (see for example Coleman, 
1987; Department for International Development, 
2011). 
Before going any further, it will be useful to 
introduce some technical terms. We will call the 
items within a logic model, theory of change, etc., 
"variables“ . Also, we will use terms based on those 
used by Pearl (2000, p. 13) to refer to variables 
according to their place within a network of 
variables, such as the network shown in Figure 1 
and the other diagrams in this article: 
 
• any variable which has an arrow pointing to 
another variable can be called a “parent” of 
the latter;  
• any variable which has an arrow pointing to 
it from another variable can be called a 
“child” of the latter;  
• any variable in a Theory which has no 
“parents” (i.e., there are no arrows pointing 
to it) can be called a “no-parent”  variable;  
• any variable which has no “children” (i.e., it 
has no arrows pointing away from it) can be 
called a “no-child” variable;  
• any variable in a Theory which is neither a 
“no-parent” variable nor a “no-child” 
variable can be called an “intermediate” 
variable.  
 
In a traditional logic model, the “no-parent” 
variables are the ones upon which we intervene and 
the “no-child” variables are the ones we value. 
Often these models are presented graphically in a 
bottom-up sense, in which case the no-parent 
variables are all those at the bottom, usually given 
names like “Inputs” or “Activities”, and all the 
variables which we value (the ones we care about, 
the ones we want to change) are at or near the top 
– usually given a name like “Goal”. 
Value is a central part of evaluation, perhaps its 
very core, as Scriven (2012) has argued 
persuasively. When looking at a Theory of Change, 
the question of what we value is just: “Which are the 
things we want to influence, which motivate us, and 
without which we wouldn’t bother with the whole 
project?” When we look at the graphical 
representations of project theories, we find that the 
underlying, implicit notion of value represented is 
a simple hierarchical one (even if the causal theory 
represented is not hierarchical). Some authors such 
as Dhillon and Vaca (2018, p. 8) do provide symbols 
for “result” or “outcome” for which a use is not 
necessarily dictated by position within the causal 
network. More generally, however, we do not have 
the differentiated tools we need to represent such 
an important concept as value within our theories. 
The method nearly always presented for 
constructing a theory of change is “backwards 
mapping” (Anderson, 2005, p. 12): to start with the 
variable(s) which we want to influence and work 
backwards from them. This procedure tends to pre-
empt the question of the value of the intervening 
steps. Intermediate variables are characterised 
merely as “preconditions”, getting their value, if 
they are valued at all, automatically, because they 
serve as means to an end. 
Rigid planning formats, popular as they are, 
have been widely criticised (Chambers & Pettit, 
2004; Davies, 2004, p. 104; Earle, 2002, p. 2) as too 
restrictive to be useful for accurately modelling a 
wide variety of project  theories and the broad range 
of different factors which may influence them. 
Specific criticisms are levelled at the use of a fixed 
number of “layers” (Inputs, Outputs, Outcomes 
etc); at the insistence that one variable may have 
only one “child” (Davies, 2004, p. 111); at the 
exclusion of factors beyond the control of the 
project (Mayne, 2015, p. 224); amongst other 
issues. A variety of more flexible templates have 
been introduced which address some of these 
issues, some of them called “theories of change”. 
For example, see Anderson (2005). 
This gives rise to a problem I call The Flexibility 
Problem. If we are to use a more flexible format for 
theories of change than for traditional logic models, 
one in which we can no longer assume that only the 
no-child variables are valuable, nor that we 
intervene on all the no-parent variables, how then 
can we show which variables  we value, and upon 
which we intervene? There is no systematic, 
accepted way to do either of these things, although 
individual project models sometimes employ 
various symbols, colors or other strategies for these 
purposes. Dhillon and Vaca (Dhillon and Vaca, 
2018, p. 80), in a recent paper on the graphical 
presentation of theories of change, suggest the use 
of a special symbol for “activities”, although they 
use it not only for “no-parent” variables but also for 
intermediate variables. 
More generally, if we provide a way to explicitly 
mark which variables are valued, rather than 
assuming without discussion that they get their 
value automatically due to their position within a 
project diagram, can this help facilitate practical 
and theoretical discussion about value within 
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theories of change and within evaluation more 
broadly? For example, Davidson (2015, p. iii), 
following Scriven, gives a good summary of the 
argument that it is not enough in an evaluation to 
simply report scores on variables, or even 
differences made by interventions to scores on 
variables, but to evaluate those scores: simply put, 
is this score good enough? Following this line of 
argumentation, is it possible to represent within a 
theory of change not only which variables are 
valued but which levels of achievement on those 
variables count as, for example, inadequate, 
acceptable or outstanding?  
 
The Definition Problem: from Theory to 
Theory of Change 
 
The second problem addressed by this article, the 
Definition Problem, is as follows: What is the 
difference between a theory showing the causal 
influences within and around a project and, more 
specifically, a theory of change for the project? Can 
we provide definitions of “Theory of Change” and 
“Theory” which show how the two are related? 
Theories about how projects or programs are 
supposed to work (Chen, 1990; Weiss and Others, 
1995) have often been hailed as a central, or even 
the central, concept within evaluation, and for good 
reason. But there is no universal or even dominant 
definition of what, in evaluation, constitutes a 
theory, or of the difference between a theory and a 
theory of change – if, indeed, there is one. These 
two terms are far from enjoying the kind of 
consensus (Vogel, 2012, p. 3) which is the case with, 
say, the OECD-DAC definitions of “effectiveness”, 
for example.  
Weiss (1995) defined a theory of change as “a 
theory of how and why an initiative works”, which 
is not so different from that given by Scriven (1981): 
“a hypothesis about the way that a program brings 
about its effects.” These are a good start. Can we go 
on to relate “theory of change”, “logic model”, and 
“theory” to one another in a more satisfying and 
useful way? 
Some authors treat the traditional logic model 
as just one part of a theory of change, namely the 
part which concerns only the intervention variables 
and their direct causal consequences, ignoring 
other influences. For an overview of this issue, see 
Blamey & Mackenzie, (2007, p. 445). Mayne (2015, 
p. 3), also referring to Patton (2008, p. 336) says 
that what turns a logic model into a theory of 
change is just precisely the addition of “no-parent” 
variables beyond the control of the project, which 
he calls “causal assumptions”. Dhillon and Vaca 
(2018) on the other hand suggest that including 
such assumptions is one factor which turns an 
ordinary theory of change into a “strong” theory of 
change.  
In the present article I intended to identify, as 
far as possible, general distinctions and definitions 
based on structural characteristics, in the belief that 
these should prove more robust than those driven 
by specific evaluation contexts, issues or agendas. 
For example, Mayne (2015, p. 122) explores the 
specific layers which many real-life theories of 
change will usually include – “behavioural 
changes”, “direct benefits”, etc. These distinctions 
are useful in many contexts but may not be 




In this article I will focus only on the formal, 
structural aspects of what constitutes a Theory of 
Change and not on the many important political 
and practical questions such as who constructs 
theories of change, for whom , why, and using what 
processes. Having said that, providing ways to 
make value visible within Theories of Change would 
certainly facilitate political, practical and ethical 
discussion about who values what – within and 
between stakeholder groups. I will also ignore 
issues of measurement and how one could, or 
should, measure the variables within a theory of 
change, or their value. Finally, my driving interest 
is in the concepts underlying theories of change and 
not primarily in the also important issue of how 
exactly we should or could visualise them 
graphically, as for example discussed by Dhillon 
and Vaca (2018) and Vaca and Vidueira (2016). The 
“heart” and “action” symbols introduced here are 
basic “Unicode” symbols (available to copy and 
paste as text on different computing platforms) 
which are generic and easy to draw by hand. In real-
life applications, more attractive realisations of 
these ideas could be used. The actual symbols are 
unimportant for the focus of this article, which is to 
make value explicit within Theories of Change.  
 
Definition of “Theory” 
 
The definition of “Theory of Change” which I 
present in the next section below is, quite literally, 
theory-based: a Theory of Change is a special type 
of Theory. So first it will be necessary to provide a 
definition of “Theory”. This definition is based 
loosely on the work of Judea Pearl (Powell, 2018; 
Pearl, 2000; Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018), who has 
provided a formal and mathematically rigorous (yet 
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non-parametric) treatment of the kind of causal 
networks which may underlie theories of change, as 
well as a set of related tools to reason about 
causality. 
I introduce the term “Theory” (with a capital 
“T”) as a new concept which is intended to be close 
enough to most existing usages of the familiar word 
“theory”, as follows: 
 
A “Theory”, in some particular context, is a 
model (e.g. a belief, claim or hypothesis; a 
description, map or picture) presenting how two 
or more variables (causally) influence one 
another: what leads to what. 
 
Figure 1 shows a simplified Theory about the 
influence of a training course for some hypothetical 
new teaching method, first upon teachers’ 
creativity, and then upon student achievement. 
 
Definition of “Theory of Change”: a 
Theory plus value (♥"#) and 
intervention (▶%&') 
 
Now at last, we will (loosely) define a “Theory of 
Change”: 
 
A Theory of Change is somebody’s Theory which 
shows how their intervention on one or more 
variables (marked with “%&'”) causally 
influences variables which they value (marked 
with “"#”). In other words, it shows how they 
can get what they want. 
This definition highlights what makes an 
ordinary Theory into a Theory of Change. I use 
capital letters to clarify that “Theory of Change” is 
another new concept: I am not claiming that this is 
the definition which everyone meant or should have 
meant all along when they talked about “theory of 
change”. But this new concept is close enough to 
previous concepts of “theory of change” to be a 
useful possible replacement. 
Figure 2 shows that we intervene on one 
variable (Amount of training which teachers receive 
on the new teaching method, marked with a “%&'”); 
our intervention sets this variable to “complete 
package delivered” rather than “nothing” and it 
shows what we value (Student academic 
achievement, marked with a “"#”); and it shows 
how these two are connected. 
This definition is formulated in terms of a 
specific “someone” – an agent who believes, values 
things, and intervenes. So “a Theory of Change” is, 
at least from a linguistic point of view, just like “a 
plan” – a plan has to be somebody’s plan, and if they 
don’t believe it, it isn’t their plan . This leaves open 
the possibility of separate or even overlapping 
theories which include different agents who may 
differ in what they believe, control or value. For the 
moment, to keep things simple, we will just assume  
that it is “we” who do the believing, intervening and 
valuing. Nevertheless, the important point is that 
constructing or reconstructing a Theory of Change 
involves two difficult modelling tasks: modelling 
not only (somebody’s) causal theory but also 
(somebody’s) “valuation theory” – at this point, 
Figure 1. A Simplified Theory About the Influence of a Training Course 
Figure 2. A Simplified Theory of Change Showing “Heart” and “Intervention” Symbols 
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“the valuation theory” is simply the set of variables 
marked as being valuable, but I generalise this idea 
below. 
As defined here, if a four-year-old child plans 
(whether implicitly or explicitly) to whine and 
whine until her father buys her ice cream, she has a 
Theory of Change . The conception of “Theory of 
Change” presented here is completely agnostic 
about the kinds of Theory involved and about the 
kinds of steps which are likely to be involved in a 
particular case. As such this is very different from 
that taken by Mayne (2015, p. 122). My aim is to 
find some general principles for modelling how 
people plan and implement behavior so there is no 
need to restrict our understanding of “Theory of 
Change” to, for example, only projects which are 
intended to benefit society, improve human rights, 
etc. I have also made no use of the typical semi-
technical terms (“output”, “intermediate result”, 
etc.) in the present article as these terms are often 
useful in specific circumstances but can be very 
difficult to use generically. 
For many organisations, a “Theory of Change” 
is often primarily a broad and inspirational 
overview. If we can understand such an overview as 
a map of what influences what and how we can 
intervene to get what we want, I would still 
understand it as a Theory of Change. If it is nothing 
but an inspirational picture, I would not. 
Value, intervention and Theory of Change 
mutually define one another: what someone values 
is what they try to maximise, given the 
opportunities they have to intervene and the theory 
they have about what leads to what. If one knows 
the Theory of Change which a particular agent has, 
one has a good chance of working out what they 
value simply by observing where and how they 
intervene in different circumstances.  
 
Valued variables should be of the form “more is 
better”. I suggest only marking a variable as valued, 
with the “"#” symbol if it is of the form “more is 
better”: it should be ordered (i.e., we should be able 
to distinguish more of it from less of it), and more 
of it should always be better in terms of the way we 
value it. In a specific context we might mark 
“number of required vaccinations actually received 
by the child” with a “"#” because more of it is 
better, whereas we would not do this with “body-
weight of the child”; although the latter is an 
important variable in many contexts, more of it is 
not always better. 
Possible extensions to this rule are discussed 
below. 
 
Predicting the difference made by an intervention. 
When we intervene on a binary variable like “the 
grant is awarded, false/true”, an intervention  
simply sets it to “true” (the state of the variable with 
the intervention, aka “factual” or “intervention” 
state) rather than “false” (the state of the variable 
without the intervention, aka “base” or perhaps 
“counterfactual” state). Similarly, we can think of 
an intervention on a continuous variable as setting 
it to one level rather than another – but as the 
variable has more than two levels, it will be 
necessary to highlight which level is the 
“intervention” level and which is the contrasting, or 
“base”, level (for example, holding 20 training 
workshops rather than zero workshops). Generally, 
a single intervention will set the levels of several 
“no-parent” variables in this way, and it might use 
feedback from downstream variables to adjust the 
release of resources in response to need; and these 
variables might stretch or repeat over time, and so 
forth. 
Real-life theories of change nearly always show 
not only, trivially, the difference made by the 
implementation on the intervention variables 
themselves but also the likely consequences on all 
the variables downstream of them which can be 
deduced using causal inference. Figure 3 does this, 
though in a rather vague and limited way. 
In Figure 3, the variable names include very 
minimal information about the differences made 
under implementation (“receive”, “increase”, 
“improve” …) – so minimal that it would be quite 
hard to falsify this Theory (how small does an 
Figure 3. A Simplified Theory of Change in Which the Labels of the Variables are Expressed in Terms of the 
Differences Made by the Intervention 
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improvement have to be in order to still count as an 
improvement?). In general, it would be desirable to 
estimate more precisely the difference made to the 
downstream variable(s) by the intervention, given 
what we know about the relevant causal influence. 
The concept of making a difference was central 
to the work of the philosopher Daniel Lewis, who 
revolutionised ideas about causation: “We think of 
a cause as something that makes a difference, and 
the difference it makes must be a difference from 
what would have happened without it” (Lewis, 
1973, p. 557). Naively, we can think of this 
“difference made” as a change over time, as the 
difference between a baseline and an endline score 
on a variable. In practice of course, baseline scores 
often change anyway, even without our 
intervention: the real “difference made” which 
should interest evaluators is the difference between 
the actual or “factual” score and the “base” score 
which would have been observed if the intervention 
(had) never happened. “Theory of Change” is 
actually a misnomer – we should be talking about 
“Theory of Difference-Making” – but it is probably 
too late to do anything about this now. 
In practice, Theories of Change rarely explicitly 
mention the strength or nature of the causal 
connections or the evidence for them. Instead, the 
process is usually reversed: we simply guess, with 
or without evidence, when constructing the Theory, 
that a certain difference made to one variable (e.g., 
giving the complete package of training rather than 
nothing) should be enough to cause some given 
difference to another (say, 15% more creative 
techniques), resulting in diagrams like Figure 4. 
Working backwards from such a diagram, our 
beliefs about the power and nature of the causal 
connections can be deduced from the variable 
labels, which include phrases like “X rather than Y” 
or “Z% improvement” – in terms of differences 
which we hope will be made to them. 
In some cases, we can treat this “difference” as 
a literal subtraction of numbers. If the percentage 
of children vaccinated is 90% following some 
intervention, and we would expect only 70% 
without it, we can say the intervention made a 
difference of 20%. In this case we might see a 
variable labelled like this: “Percentage of children 
vaccinated improved by 20%”. In other cases, the 
difference made cannot be literally expressed as a 
subtraction and we might prefer to specifically 
mention both the intervention state and the 
contrasting base state, perhaps using the phrase 
“rather than”. For example, “teachers frequently 
use a whole range of creative techniques (rather 
than hardly ever using any)”. Most real-life theories 
of change gloss over these niceties and simply 
combine the name of the variable and the difference 
made into something as vague as “Improved 
creativity”, leaving any details for the more boring 
parts of the planning documentation. 
To summarise the ideas in this section: 
interventions consist in setting the levels of one or 
more variables, marked with a “%&'” symbol (or 
other suitable symbol), to one level (“the 
intervention level”) rather than another (“the base 
level”, which they would have had without the 
intervention). Often, intervention variables are in 
any case expressed in binary false/true form, in 
which case the intervention simply sets them to true 
rather than false (“do this” rather than “do not do 
this”). Usually, when Theories of Change are 
presented, the consequences of this intervention on 
all the downstream variables (according to what we 
know about the nature, strength etc. of the causal 
links) is actually noted as part of the variable label 
in more detail (e.g., “20% increase in vaccinations” 
or even “12,000 rather than 10,000 vaccinations”) 
or less detail (“increased vaccinations”). In 
particular we are interested in differences made to 
the variables we value, which are marked with a 
“"#” symbol  (or some other suitable symbol).  
 
Figure 4. A Simplified Theory of Change in which the Labels of the Variables are Expressed in Terms of the 
Differences made by the Intervention, with More Detail Given About the Differences 
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Where do Valued Variables and 
Intervention Variables Appear in a 
Theory of Change?  
 
Marking some “no-child” variables as intervention 
variables. Within logical frameworks or logic 
models, all the “no-parent” variables are also 
intervention variables (the points where we can 
intervene). Theories of change are distinguished 
from such models in part because they explicitly 
include “no-parent” variables which are not 
intervention variables - at least not by “us”. 
The suggestion made here is to formalise this 
distinction by marking intervention variables with 
the “%&'” symbol and leaving other “no-parent” 
variables unmarked, whether we think of these as 
completely external influences such as the weather, 
or as those parts of an explicit “causal package” 
(Mayne, 2015, p. 124) upon which we ourselves do 
not intervene. 
We will only use the “%&'” symbol on “no-
parent” variables, and not on intermediate  
variables. This is because there is something 
incoherent about saying “We decided to do X; but 
also, our decision was caused by factors A, B and C”. 
 
Intermediate variables can be valued. As 
mentioned above, it is usually assumed without 
discussion that only no-child variables can be 
ultimately valuable. If intermediate variables are 
treated as valuable at all, it is only in virtue of their 
being links in a chain, and in proportion to their 
distance from the end of it. Project management 
may be criticised for focusing “merely” on 
intermediate variables. There may be good reasons 
for this kind of criticism, such as when someone has 
been trying to imply that project success consists in, 
say, attendance at endless workshops. It is often 
right to ask about an intermediate variable: "What 
is the real use of that?” But it is wrong to express 
this point by banning anyone from recording 
intermediate variables as valued. There really are 
times when we need to be able to say “Alongside 
improving student outcomes, we also want the 
teachers to use creative techniques (an 
intermediate variable); this is simply something we 
value in its own right”, as shown in Figure 5. 
Perhaps we have a conception of teacher 
professional development in which this is a key 
factor; perhaps we just love all things creative. In 
other words, we might value it because it is the kind 
of thing which contributes to things like the valued 
variable causally downstream, or perhaps because 
it might causally contribute to some other valued 
variable which has not been mentioned, but (most 
interestingly) for no reason at all: we simply value 
it. 
It is surprising how seeing a variable as a link 
in a causal chain which leads to something valued 
seems to discourage us from considering it, at the 
same time, as valuable in its own right. But there is 
nothing logically incoherent about someone 
valuing an outcome which also causally reinforces 
another outcome which they also value. Of course, 
a sceptic can say of any variable, not just an 
intermediate one, “aha, but why is that valuable, 
why is student academic achievement valuable, 
what does that lead to, what is it good for?” And 
indeed, this might provoke a substantive discussion 
about work-life balance, the problems of stress in 
young people, etc. But we must know where to stop 
and accept that some things just are valued in their 
own right. Otherwise we will fall into an “infinite 
regress” in which the sceptic keeps asking “but why 
is that valuable?”, and the discussion never ends. As 
Wittgenstein wrote, (1978, p. 3) “Explanations 
come to an end somewhere”. 
For any of these reasons, if in fact we (also) 
value an intermediate variable we can mark that 
with a “"#” symbol, as is the case with the variable 
concerning creative techniques in Figure 5. 
There is nothing intrinsic to any given variable 
(neither its duration, nor its purported 
sustainability, nor its position in a diagram, nor 
what it involves – e.g., human behavior or technical 
achievements) which says whether or not it is 
suitable for being valued by us. A variable is only 
Figure 5. Simplified Theory of Change in which an Intermediate Variable is Valued as well as a “No-child” Variable. 
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valued if someone happens to value it, as the 
thought experiment in Figures 6 and 7 remind us. 
Each of these two stories is plausible in its own 
context. In the first, the students are told that 
winning games is ultimately only important 
because it promotes work ethic and team spirit; in 
the second, they are told that team success is what 
really counts and that is the real reason for 
promoting work ethic and team spirit. Both stories 
are perfectly coherent. 
Some philosophers have suggested (see 
Donnelly (2013) for an overview) that there is in 
fact a right and proper place for this kind of “why is 
that valuable?” questioning to end. Such a place 
might be for example, “human rights” Some 
approaches to project planning do implement this 
idea in practice, as in “Rights-Based Approaches”. 
Adherents of this theory would claim that variables 
are only ultimately worth influencing if they 
contribute to improving or protecting human 
rights. Other authors suggest concepts such as 
“well-being” as typical or generic final carriers of 
value for most theories of change (Mayne, 2015, p. 
123). 
But limiting our theories of change in this way 
means limiting their generality. For example, if we 
say that only Human Rights are ultimately valuable, 
there could be no theory of change of, say, a 
biodiversity intervention unless one really wanted 
to perform the acrobatics of arguing that all 
biodiversity interventions are actually valuable 
because, and only because, they improve well-being 
or human rights. In the present article I am taking 
the stance that evaluators need a tool-kit which, 
having helped them to model the project theory, 
also allows them to model the way an arbitrary 
stakeholder or client happens to value things, 
without telling them what they ought to be valuing. 
(This stance does not imply that just because 
someone says they value some arbitrary thing, they 
do in fact value it. Firstly, Claiming that something 
is valuable is not a fact-free choice separate from 
what others value. Secondly, it only makes sense if 
the person’s actual behaviour is generally in 
alignment with the claim. We touch on this point 
again below). 
We allow intermediate variables to be valued. 
This might seem like a relatively trivial step, but it 
can have significant ramifications for the way we 
think about, monitor and manage projects. This 
step takes us beyond any “Results-Based” approach 
(Kusek & Rist, 2004) in the sense that it is not 
restricted to valuing only the ends of causal chains. 
In this way it can also encompass approaches like 
Outcome Mapping (Earl, Carden, & Smutylo, 
2001), which specifically values “Progress Markers” 
– changes in the attitudes and behaviour of 
immediate partners (Guijt, 2008, p. 2) – 
acknowledging that these changes may well, 
hopefully, go on to cause other desirable changes, 
but essentially shifting the focus from such “ends” 
to the progress markers themselves. More broadly, 
this approach encourages us to re-visit the 
importance of how we do things (such as acting out 
of principle) as well as acting in order to reach a 
particular goal. “Acting out of principle” is a value 
which is in a constant tension with the goals it 
might help reach further down a causal chain; it is 
meaningless without them but cannot be reduced to 
them. 
This step also encourages us to free ourselves 
from other restrictions imposed upon project 
planning by hierarchical templates such as those 
involving timing and duration. If we no longer 
automatically assume that the value of a variable 
comes purely and automatically from the number of 
links separating it from the end of a causal chain, 
we also no longer need to assume that the most 
Figure 6. Simplified Theory of Change in which success of school soccer team is explained as being important only 
because it promotes work ethic and team spirit. To that end, the teacher intervenes to provide training designed 
primarily to improve chances of winning games. 
Figure 7. Simplified Theory of Change in which work ethic and team spirit in school soccer team are explained as 
being important because they promote team success. To that end, the teacher intervenes to provide training 
designed primarily to improve work ethic and team spirit. 
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valuable variables are necessarily just exactly those 
which take longest to achieve or which will sustain 
the longest.  
 
“No-child” variables need not be valued. There is 
no reason why a Theory of Change should not 
include “no-child” variables which are not valued. 
For example, we might want to note the possibility 
of some interesting downstream consequences 
which we do not directly care about ourselves – 
beyond our intervention, beyond even the variables 
which we value. For example, we might note that 
our project to open a new cultural center might 
have some implications for traffic flows.  
 
Intervention variables can be valued. Having 
acknowledged the use of the “"#” symbol to mark 
not only “no-child” variables but also intermediate 
variables as valuable, we now realise there is 
nothing to stop us valuing intervention variables 
themselves. For example, perhaps I value helping 
my neighbor for its own sake. I have been brought 
up to be a helpful person and I just love that role. I 
also, of course, value the consequences, but that is 
not my only motivation. 
A related example is what is sometimes called 
the “humanitarian imperative” (International 
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies, 1994, p. 3): I might claim that it is a good 
thing, or an essential thing, in and of itself, to lend 
a helping hand to people in need – for example after 
a disaster. I might also get involved in important 
and complicated arguments about the possible 
unintended negative consequences versus the 
positive consequences of such help; but this may 
have nothing to do with my valuing the act of 
helping in its own right . Again, the temptation to 
judge the act of helping as “merely” a means to an 
end – presented, as it is, as part of a causal chain, 
and therefore not one which can be “really” valued 




This basic idea of explicitly marking the variables 
which we value within a Theory of Change can be 
extended in various ways.  
 
Highlighting Relative Priority by Using More 
Than One “ "#” Symbol 
 
It can be useful for stakeholders during project 
implementation, as well as for ex-ante evaluators, 
to know the relative importance of different valued 
variables, for example to help decide where 
resources should go, or should have gone. While 
there might sometimes be good reasons for not 
having or publicising such a prioritisation, here is a 
suggestion for how to do it when required: If there 
is more than one valued variable, we can use 
varying numbers of “"#” symbols to show their 
relative priority. For example, we might put two 
symbols next to “Student academic achievement 
"#"#” and just one by “Extent to which teachers 
use creative techniques "#”, to show the greater 
priority of the former. This can be done in a purely 
illustrative manner, or in conjunction with a more 
precise weighting (see final section). This kind of 
weighting could be expressed in a different form, 
for example like this: “"# = 2.5”, “"# = 4”, etc.  
 
Highlighting Negative Value and Cost 
 
What about variables like “morbidity” or “stress” or 
“environmental damage” which have a negative 
valence? These break the “more is better” rule given 
above. We could use the “"#” symbol for them but 
this might be misleading. Instead I suggest using a 
different symbol which suggests a negative valence 
such as “)*+” or some other suitable symbol, 
reserving the heart symbol for positive valence. 
Similarly, although variables which represent 
costs could also be marked with a “)*+” symbol, we 
could also consider a special way to mark them, 
perhaps with one or more “$” symbols. For 
example, stakeholders could be reminded of which 
“no-parent” variables were particularly expensive 
by marking them with a greater number of “$” 
symbols.  
 
Highlighting Valued Variables Which Are Not 
Ordered 
 
There are many other ways in which a variable 
might be intrinsically important to us, but we 
cannot say of it that “more is better”. 
Figure 8. Simple Theory of Change in Which a “no-parent” Variable is Valued as Well as a “no-child” Variable. 
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For example, in Ainsworth’s theory of 
children’s emotional and developmental 
attachment, the “attachment style” of a child to a 
main caregiver is seen as a very important factor 
going forward; some attachment styles (“anxious-
ambivalent”; “anxious-avoidant”; “disorganized-
disoriented”) are seen as being less beneficial for 
the child, whereas “secure” is more beneficial 
(Ainsworth, Waters, & Walls, 1978). But I would not 
recommend characterising the variable 
“attachment style” as valuable without further 
comment because it is, as such, not even an ordered 
variable: we cannot sort the different styles into a 
single dimension of better versus worse. Their 
clinical relevance cannot be reduced to points on a 
good/bad continuum. We could perhaps use a 
“"#?” symbol to show that something here is 
valuable but not in a “more-is-better” way. We can 
contrast this with an alternative, ordered variable 
which represents simply how secure a child’s 
attachment is (and which loses some of the other 
aspects of the original variable): this could certainly 
be marked with the “"#” symbol.  
 
Dealing with Multiple Stakeholders 
 
Up to now, we have only seen value "# and 
intervention %&' symbols used globally to show 
what “we”, the makers of the Theory, value and 
control. Using the same ideas, I will zoom out to 
take a perspective which includes multiple 
stakeholders. This has similarities with an 
evaluation approach  introduced by Hansen and 
Vedung (2010) which keeps the project theories 
held by different stakeholders separate rather than 
trying to always establish a consensus theory, which 
they argue is the approach used in an overwhelming 
majority of cases. 
When different stakeholders or “agents” 
interact, they usually control different variables. 
This can be done by writing the name of the agent 
before the %&' symbol, as in Figure 9. We can use 
"# symbols, preceded by the name of the agent who 
values this particular variable, in the same way. 
Alternatively, it might be more convenient to color 
the "# and %&' symbols differently for each 
stakeholder or stakeholder group, along with an 
appropriate legend for reference. 
This kind of presentation can be useful for 
underlining that different agents might do different 
things or put a different emphasis on the same 
things as they have different motivations. It 
suggests a way of modelling stakeholder motivation 
which is very different from the conventional, more 
behaviourist perspectives familiar from public 
health research such as COM-B (Michie, van 
Stralen, & West, 2011). It might help understand 
the behaviour of stakeholders and stakeholder 
groups in terms of their own (cognitive, if not 
explicitly formulated) theories of change – the way 
they view the world and how they can get what they 
want. 
In Figure 9, all the agents value the main 
outcome, improved teaching, whereas the 
increased pay to which the teacher is entitled after 
completing the training is a positive motivation for 
the teacher but a negative one for the Ministry. In 
addition, part of the trainer’s motivation is simply 
the act of providing pro-bono training itself. 
In this case, the agents differ (but overlap) on 
two of the aspects of the Theory of Change (the 
variables on which they can intervene and the 
variables which they value) but share the third 
aspect, namely the Theory itself, the variables and 
causal connections shown here. What if they differ 
on the Theory itself? 
 
• If their different Theories mostly overlap 
but one or two stakeholder groups take 
account of one or two variables which are 
ignored by others, it is possible just to mark 
Figure 9. Simplified Theory of Change in Which Three Stakeholders Differ in What They Value and Where They 
Intervene. 
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that fact on the relevant variables using the 
“agent: …” notation used already for value 
and intervention in Figure 5 (or by using 
different colours).  
• It might also be possible to mark different 
ideas about the causal links by marking the 
arrows in the same way, i.e. by using the 
“agent: …” notation or by using different 
colours.  
• But when there are large differences 
between the Theories, this approach 
becomes very unwieldy and it will be 
necessary to present a series of separate 
Theories, using common elements 
wherever possible.  
 
It is interesting to note that one of Chen and 
Rossi’s (1980) original papers on Theory-Based 
Evaluation focuses also on multiple goals and the 
possibility of re-assessing originally posited goals. 
  
Modelling Valuation Theories 
 
So far this article have presented, firstly, two 
symbols for turning a project Theory into a Theory 
of Change by highlighting which variables are to be 
intervened upon, which are valued, and how the 
former influence the latter; and secondly, more 
details on how this idea could be implemented and 
extended in various ways. 
The final part of the present article takes the 
idea of simply marking which variables are valued 
and generalises it to modelling everything about the 
way a stakeholder calculates and compares value 
within and between projects: their complete 
valuation theory. “Valuation theory” is related to 
the concept of “normative theory” as discussed by 
Chen: “guidance on what goals and outcomes 
should be pursued or examined” and is even closer 
to “normative theory” as discussed by Hansen and 
Vedung (2010, p. 300), with reference to Chen: 
“Notions concerning why the various aspects of the 
situation that are supposed to be affected by the 
intervention are preferable or not preferable to the 
situation without the intervention or with another 
intervention.” However, Hansen and Vedung do 
not give many further details of this concept. 
In the simplest case, an organisation might well 
care about, say, both environmental benefit and 
number of children vaccinated due to a project 
without ever wanting to combine the two into one 
measure. There are often good reasons for keeping 
variables separate even when they seem to measure 
the same thing – for example, a rescue mission 
might have saved five lives but sadly led to the death 
of one of the rescuers. It might be quite abhorrent, 
and would probably be of little use, to say that the 
net outcome was “plus four lives”. In a Theory of 
Change with valued variables, if we do not need to 
ask or answer questions about how much we value 
specific changes on each valued variable, or about 
their combined value, as long as they are “more is 
better” variables, we can simply mark them as 
valued and leave it at that. Our evaluation report 
could mention the valuation of both without trying 
to combine or synthesise them. 
But what if an evaluation task does involve 
modelling more sophisticated valuation theories in 
which value is defined in terms of transformations 
and combinations of other variables? We have not 
yet covered this possibility, although it was already 
Figure 10. A simplified Theory of Change Showing a Valued Variable Which is Defined in Terms of Other Variables. 
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implied when we added the idea, above, of marking 
variable priority and marking variables which were 
associated with cost. 
For example, a client or stakeholder may want 
to define some overall score or assessment by 
combining the scores on many related valued 
variables such as a cumulative number of events 
over time, or the scores of a cohort of students. 
These can be combined by taking, for example, a 
numerical total or average by taking note of the 
number of students who exceed a minimum 
threshold, or by some other method. 
We can actually show these combinations 
directly within the Theory of Change by introducing 
defined variables which are also valued variables, as 
in Figure 10. Suppose our client tells us that student 
academic achievement and teachers’ use of creative 
techniques are both equally valuable. We agree to 
rate both variables on a 0-5 scale and construct an 
overall rating which is simply the sum of the two. In 
Figure 10, we model the latter with a defined 
variable, marked by a dashed border to show that it 
is not necessary or even logically possible to collect 
additional data for it; the “raw” data from the two 
variables which define it is all we need. In addition, 
a dashed arrow is also used to show a definitional, 
rather than causal, relationship (Powell, 2017). This 
network of dashed definitions is the “valuation 
theory”, built on top of the causal theory . 
Another example: suppose a local non-
governmental organisation in a flood-prone area is 
working on flood resilience. They want to ensure 
that every village has both an early warning siren 
and an early warning plan. They are not interested 
in villages only installing a siren or in villages only 
adopting a plan. They want to see villages with both. 
Again, we can model this situation using dashed 
lines, as in Figure 11. 
 In Figure 11, the arrowheads are joined to show 
some kind of interaction, and the label “AND” 
specifies that both parent variables have to be true 
for the child variable to be true. But where does the 
“"#” symbol go? On the defined variable B or the 
variables S and P which are part of its definition? In 
this case at least, S and P are only valuable in 
combination so perhaps we should just put the 
symbol on B. 
There are myriad other ways in which our 
valuation of a project might involve defined 
variables which transform and combine other 
variables. For example, we will need to be able to 
deal with variables which are stretched across time 
– and potentially into the future  – as well as with 
variables which are associated with some particular 
time-point, such as an end-line. For example, we 
often need to define a variable which collects the 
cumulative value of another variable. Given a 
Theory of Change which includes a variable 
representing the number of visitors to a youth 
center over time, we can define a variable which 
collects the total number of visits over a given 
period, accompanied perhaps by another valued 
variable which collects information about the 
percentage of female visitors. 
Figure 11. Simplified Theory of Change in Which the Single Valued Variable B is Defined as S “AND” P (i.e., it is 
only true when both S and P are true). 
Figure 12. Fragment of a Theory of Change and Valuation Theory for a Youth Project (the right-hand variable is 
defined in terms of variables which are themselves defined in terms of others). 
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We can also define valued variables on the basis 
of other variables which are themselves defined, as 
in Figure 12. 
It is not always necessary to even show all the 
intermediate variables in a Theory of Change if only 
the final, “no-child” variable is valued, especially if 
they are themselves only defined variables, as in 
Figure 12.  By all means, we could live without these 
intermediate variables and note the details of the 
corresponding calculations separately. In the 
valuation Theory just as in the causal Theory, the 
level of detail which should be shown depends on 
the use. 
Often it is not enough to simply report that 
there was a very high score on, or very substantial 
difference made to, a valued variable. We need to 
know is that good enough? Did it meet a certain 
target or standard? To allow the asking and 
answering of this kind of question, it will be 
necessary to allow the interpretation of specific 
levels of specific variables (i.e., not just “more / less 
valuable”, but, for example, “good enough / not 
good enough” and more specifically to address 
questions like “Was the change made quickly 
enough?”). Essentially, this establishes variables 
which are not only valued but have a specific form 
in which the lowest values are interpreted as 
something like “very poor, very unsatisfactory” and 
the highest values are interpreted as something like 
“very good, very satisfactory”. Scriven (1967) calls 
this kind of scale a “goal scale”. We can use an 
anchor symbol (“,-”) instead of a heart in this case. 
The anchor symbol says: “ We have cut to the chase: 
specific scores on this scale are not just arbitrary, 
but mean things like accept, reject, outstanding, not 
good enough, etc.” 
The use of evaluative rubrics (King, McKegg, 
Oakden, & Wehipeihana, 2013) is a very promising 
way to facilitate this process and provide the 
necessary interpretations of the levels of the 
variables in question . 
We can use the same ideas to extend a simple 
valuation theory into the logical skeleton of an 
evaluation. We can define new variables to provide 
evaluative comparisons, for example comparing 
benefits with costs. Some classic evaluation 
questions such as “cost-effectiveness” can be 
understood in this way as comparisons between 
variables which are usually already present in a 
Theory of Change. In this way, we can see an 
evaluation as, amongst other things, constructing a 
valuation theory on top of a Theory of Change: a 
valuation theory in which the values are 
constructed by the evaluator in interaction with the 
Terms of Reference and with stakeholders. This 
(e)valuation theory often differs in some ways from 
that intrinsic to the project, perhaps including 
additional (defined) criteria which were not part of 
the original project plan. 
Using defined variables in our (e)valuation 
theories also allows us to model how our valuation 
of some (numerically measurable) variables does 
not seem to be linear. For example, in the case of 
the body weight of a child, we might value medium 
weights the most and extreme weights less. In this 
way we can provide a new valued variable, called 
something like “healthy weight score” which is 
defined in terms of the physical weight using a non-
linear, inverted-U-shaped, function, giving a low 
score for extreme weights and a high score for 
moderate weights. 
Real-life theories of change very often include 
“goal-level” variables which are not actually caused 
by the variables pointing to them but which are a 
summary of them. Using dotted lines can help to 
avoid mixing up causal with definitional links 
(Powell, 2017). 
As a final point, it will also be essential to show 
how this task of modelling a valuation theory – like 
all other evaluation tasks – can work with non-
numerical, as well as numerical, variables. In 
Figure 10, if the scores were expressed simply as 
“outstanding” in both cases, then even without a 
numerical score we should be able to summarise 
these two results at least as “outstanding” and 
certainly not as “poor”: a non-numerical reasoning 
Figure 13. As Figure 12 (but the right-hand variable is an “anchor” variable: for example, specific low scores or 
ranges of low scores mean something like “inadequate”, and high scores mean something like “adequate”). 
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process – see Scriven (2012) – which we could call 
“soft arithmetic”. 
The evaluation task which I have here 
described as “modelling the valuation theory” 
corresponds very well with the list of “evaluation-
specific methodologies” given by Davidson (2015, 
p. 6)  and can be seen as a central one in evaluation. 
This section has discussed some essential 
extensions to the basic definition of a Theory of 
Change given above.  
  
Conclusion and Challenges 
 
In the Introduction I presented the Flexibility 
Problem: (If we are to use a more flexible format for 
theories of change, how can we show which 
variables we value, which we intervene on) and the 
Definition Problem (What is the difference between 
a Theory showing the causal influences within and 
around a project and, more specifically, a Theory of 
Change for the project?). I argued that the “"#” and 
“%&'” symbols are a direct answer to both problems. 
The body of the present article has suggested a 
definition of “Theory of Change” as a special kind of 
Theory which involves these two concepts, in the 
course of which it was first necessary to provide a 
loose definition of “Theory”. I have paid particular 
attention to the “"#” symbol and the task of 
modelling what we value within a Theory. Showing 
explicitly, within a Theory, which variables are 
valued can help bring the issue of value within 
Theories of Change to the forefront. 
The tools presented only allow us to do quite 
rudimentary modelling of value. For one thing, the 
underlying definition of Theory presented here 
needs to be enriched, for example, to include 
Theories which include emergent, changing or 
hard-to-predict variables and links, feedback loops, 
etc. But, in particular, the way we model value 
needs to be extended to address at least some of the 
following issues: 
 
• valuing the difference made on valued 
variables as a consequence of some 
intervention. Above, I suggested that 
evaluations need to be able to assess the 
difference which an intervention makes to 
valued variables. But does this mean that 
we are dealing with some kind of 
subtraction – if an intervention improves 
some valued outcome score from, say, 5 to 
7, can we say that the intervention has 
produced “two units of value”?  
• distinguishing between valuation which is 
implicit and valuation which is explicit. 
Does it make sense to say to a client “In 
your plan you’ve forgotten to say that you 
also really value X, … you do, don’t you? … 
shall we add it?” Does it perhaps even make 
sense to say “this agent actually values X, 
but won’t admit it”?  
• capturing the way an evaluator might feel 
ethically or professionally compelled to 
critique a client’s own valuation, perhaps 
from the perspective of a wider, shared 
system of values, effectively saying: “These 
things that you value, they aren’t really so 
valuable”, or “You said you value X, but 
doesn’t that conflict with your commitment 
to human rights”? What happens if the 
evaluator actually manages to shift the 
client’s views?  
• capturing how clients may value not only 
specific variables but a whole process,  for 
example when a donor wants to know 
about any detrimental impacts of any part 
of a project on the environment.  
• modelling what happens when a valuation 
theory is changed, for example during a 
project, perhaps in accordance with a fixed 
set of “higher” values or as part of a process 
of adaptation of values.  
 
 In conclusion, we can note that the approaches 
introduced here have had some interesting and 
important side-effects. Three of the most 
interesting are as follows: 
 
• They suggest that it is the task of evaluators 
to model how stakeholders value aspects of 
a project just as much as it is their task to 
model the causal chains within a project.  
• These approaches can help model the fact 
that stakeholders may value variables 
which are not at the end of a causal chain. 
This throws a new light on the debate 
between results-based and principles-
based programming. 
• They open up a way to understand the 
behaviour of stakeholders and stakeholder 
groups in terms of their own theories of 
change – the way they view the world and 
how they can get what they want – rather 
than from the kind of behaviourist 
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